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This article is based on a lecture delivered at the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research, Chicago,
Illinois, on March 17, 1959.-EDIToR.

Although one is sometimes inclined to despair
of any constructive changes in the administration
of criminal justice, a glance at the history of the
past half-century reveals a succession of the most
significant developments. Thus, the last fifty
years have seen the widespread acceptance of
three legal inventions of great importance: the
juvenile court, systems of probation and of parole.
During the same period, under the inspiration of
continental research and writing, scientific criminology became an established field of instruction
and inquiry in American universities and in other
research agencies. At the same time, psychiatry
made its remarkable contributions to the theory
of human behavior and, more specifically, of that
form of human behavior described as criminal.
These developments have been accompanied by
nothing less than a revolution in public conceptions
of the nature of crime and the criminal, and in
public attitudes toward the proper treatment of
the convicted offender.'
This history with its complex developments of
thought, institutional behavior, and public attitudes must be approached gingerly; for in dealing
with it we are in peril of committing the sin of
oversimplification.
Nevertheless, despite the
presence of contradictions and paradox, it seems
possible to detect one common element in much of
this thought and activity which goes far to characterize the history we are considering. This common
element or theme I shall describe, for want of a
better phrase, as the rise of the rehabilitative ideal.
The rehabilitative ideal is itself a complex of
ideas which, perhaps, defies completely precise
statement. The essential points, however, can be
I These developments have been surveyed in Allen,
Law and the Future: Criminal Law and Administration.
51 Nw. L. REv. 207, 207-208 (1956). See also HARNO,
Some Significant Deelopments in Criminal Law and
Procedure in the Lart Century, 42 J. CRIM. L., C. AND

P.S. 427 (1951).

articulated. It is assumed, first, that human
behavior is the product of antecedent causes.
These causes can be identified as part of the
physical universe, and it is the obligation of the
scientist to discover and to describe them with all
possible exactitude. Knowledge of the antecedents
of human behavior makes possible an approach to
the scientific control of human behavior. Finally,
and of primary significance for the purposes at
hand, it is assumed that measures employed to
treat the convicted 5ffender should serve a therapeutic function, that such measures should be
designed to effect changes in the behavior of the
convicted person in the interests of his own
happiness, health, and satisfactions and in the
interest of social defense.
Although these ideas are capable of rather
simple statement, they have provided the arena
for some of the modern world's most acrimonious
controversy. And the disagreements among those
who adhere in general to these propositions have
been hardly less intense than those prompted by
the dissenters. This is true, in part, because these
ideas possess a delusive simplicity. No idea is
more pervaded with ambiguity than the notion of
reform or rehabilitation. Assuming, for example,
that we have the techniques to accomplish our
ends of rehabilitation, are we striving to produce
in the convicted offender something called "adjustment" to his social environment or is our objective
something different from or more than this? By
what scale of values do we determine the ends of
therapy?2
These are intriguing questions, well worth extended consideration. But it is not my purpose to
pursue them in this paper. Rather, I am concerned
2 "We see that it is not easy to determine what we
consider to be the sickness and what we consider to be
the cure." FROMM, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION
(1950) 73.. See also the author's development of these
points at 67-77.
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with describing some of the dilemmas and conflicts
of values that have resulted from efforts to impose
the rehabilitative ideal on the system of criminal
justice. I know of no area in which a more effective
demonstration can be made of the necessity for
greater mutual understanding between the law
and the behavioral disciplines.
There is, of course, nothing new in the notion of
reform or rehabilitation of the offender as one
objective of the penal process. This idea is given
important emphasis, for example, in the thought
of the medieval churchmen. The church's position,
as described by Sir Francis Palgrave, was that
punishment was not to be "thundered in vengeance
for the satisfaction of the state, but imposed for
the good of the offender: in order to afford the
means of amendment and to lead the transgressor
to repentance, and to mercy. ' 3 Even Jeremy
Bentham, whose views modem criminology has
often scorned and more often ignored, is found
saying: "It is a great merit in a punishment to
contribute to the refornmation of the offender, not
only through fear of being punished again, but by
a change in his character and habits. ' 4 But this is
far from saying that the modern expression of the
rehabilitative ideal is not to be sharply distinguished from earlier expressions. The most
important differences, I believe, are two. First, the
modern' statement of the rehabilitative ideal is
accompanied by, and largely stems from, the
development of scientific disciplines concerned
with human behavior, a development not remotely
approximated in earlier periods when notions of
reform of the offender were advanced. Second, and
of equal importance for the purposes at hand, in
no other period has the rehabilitative ideal so
completely dominated theoretical and scholarly
inquiry, to such an extent that in some quarters
it is almost assumed that matters of treatment
and reform of the offender are the only questions
worthy of serious attention in the whole field of
criminal justice and corrections.

century should put us on our guard. No social
institutions as complex as those involved in the
administration of criminal justice serve a single
function or purpose. Social institutions are multivalued and multi-purposed. Values and purposes
are likely on occasion to prove inconsistent and to
produce internal conflict and tension. A theoretical
orientation that evinces concern for only one or a
limited number of purposes served by the institution must inevitably prove partial and unsatisfactory. In certain situations it may prove positively dangerous. This stress on the unfortunate
consequences of the rise of the rehabilitative ideal
need not involve failure to recognize the substantial benefits that have also accompanied its
emergence. Its emphasis on the fundamental
problems of human behavior, its numerous contributions to the decency of the criminal-law processes
are of vital importance. But the limitations and
dangers of modern trends of thought need clearly
to be identified in the interest, among others, of the
rehabilitative ideal, itself.
My first proposition is that the rise of the
rehabilitative ideal has dictated what questions
are to be investigated, with the result that many
matters of equal or even greater importance have
been ignored or cursorily examined. This tendency
can be abundantly illustrated. Thus, the concentration of interest on the nature and needs of the
criminal has resulted in a remarkable absence of
interest in the nature of crime. This is, indeed,
surprising, for on reflection it must be apparent
that the question of what is a. crime is logically the
prior issue: how crime is defined determines in
large measure who the criminal is who becomes
eligible for treatment and therapy. 5 A related
observation was made some years ago by Professor
Karl Llewellyn, who has done as much as any man
to develop sensible interdisciplinary inquiry involving law and the behavioral disciplines:' "When
I was younger I used to hear smuggish assertions
among my sociological friends, such as: "Itake the
sociological, not the legal, approach to crime'; and

THE TNARROWING OF SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS

This narrowing of interests prompted by the rise
of the rehabilitative ideal during the past half3Quoted in DALzELL,
RELATED MATTERS (1955)
4

BENEFIT OF CLERGY AND

13.

BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (Ogden,
C. K., ed., 1931) 338-339. (Italics in the original.) But
Bentham added: "But when [the writers] come to speak
about the means of preventing offenses, of rendering
men better, of perfecting morals, their imagination
grows warm, their hopes excited; one would suppose

they were about to produce the great secret, and that
the human race was going to receive a new form. It is
because we have a more magnificent idea of objects in
proportion as they are less familiar, and because the
imagination has a loftier flight amid vague projects
which have never been subjected to the limits of
analysis." Id. at 359.
5Cf. HART, The Ains of the Criminal Lawv, 23 LAW
AND CONT. PRoB. 401 (1958).
See LLEWELLYN AND HOEBEL, TUE CHEYENINE
WAY (1941). See also Crime, Law and Social Science:
A Symposium, 34 Cor.ui. L.Rvv. 27.7 (1934).
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behavioral sciences might contribute vital insights.
This they have largely failed to do, and we are the
poorer for it.
Another example of the narrowing of interests
that has accompanied the rise of the rehabilitative
ideal is the lack of concern with the idea of deterrence-indeed the hostility evinced by many
modern criminologists toward it. This, again, is a
most surprising development.13 It must surely be
apparent that the criminal law has a general
preventive function to perform in the interests of
public order and of security of life, limb, and
possessions. Indeed, there is reason to assert that
the influence of criminal sanctions on the millions
who never engage in serious criminality is of
greater social importance than their impact on the
hundreds of thousands who do. Certainly, the
assumption of those who make our laws is that the
denouncing of conduct as criminal and providing
the means for the enforcement of the legislative
prohibitions will generally have a tendency to
prevent or minimize such behavior. Just what the
precise mechanisms of deterrence are is not well
understood. Perhaps it results, on occasion, from
the naked threat of punishment. Perhaps, more
frequently, it derives from a more subtle process
wherein the mores and moral sense of the community are recruited to advance the attainment of
the criminal law's objectives1 4 The point is that
we know very little about these vital matters, and
the resources of the behavioral sciences have
rarely been employed to contribute knowledge and
insight in their investigation. Not only have the
criminologists displayed little interest in these
matters, some have suggested that the whole idea
of general prevention is invalid or worse. Thus,
speaking of the deterrent theory of punishment,
the authors of a leading textbook in criminology
assert: "This is simply a derived rationalization of
revenge. Though social revenge is the actual
psychological basis of punishment today, the
7Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology,
62 HARV. L. REv. 1286, 1287 (1949).
apologists for the punitive regime are likely to
8 ALuXN. op. cit. supra, note 1, at 207-210.
9 See, especially, his CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCL% bring forward in their defense the more sophisticated, but equally futile, contention that punishRECONSTRUCTION (1946).
10WmTE-CoLLAR CRi E (1949) See also CLINAD, ment deters from [sic] crime."' 5 We are thus conTnE BrAcx MARKET (1952).
fronted by a situation in which the dominance of
" Cf. CALDWELL, A Re-examination of the Concept of
White-Collar Crime, 22 FED. PROB. 30 (March, 1958).
the rehabilitative ideal not only diverts attention
1-An interesting question of this kind is now being
13But see A.DE.;AES, General Prevention-Illusion
debated in England centering on the proposals for
enhanced penalties for prostitution offenses made in the or Reality? 43 J.CalM. L., C. AND P.S. 176 (1952).
1This seems to be the assertion of Garafalo. See his
recently-issued Wolfenden Report. See FAi.FiELD,
CluasoLonY (Millar trans. 1914) 241-242.
Notes on Prostitution,9 Brr. J. DELiN. 164, 173 (1959).
1"BA ES AND TEETERS, NEw HordzoNs Lx CRImSee also AI=N, The Borderland of the Criminal Law:
INOLOGY (2nd ed. 1954) 337. The context in which these
Problems of 'Socializing' Criminal Justice, 32 Soc. SER.
statements appear also deserves attention.
REV. 107. 110-111 (1958).
I suspect an inquiring reporter could still hear
much the same (perhaps with 'psychiatric' often
substituted for 'sociological')-though it is surely
somewhat obvious that when you take 'the legal'
out, you also take out'crime' "! This disinterest in
the definition of criminal behavior has afflicted the
lawyers quite as much as the behavioral scientists.
Even the criminal law scholar has tended, until
recently, to assume that problems of procedure
8
and treatment are the things that "really matter".
Only the issue of criminal responsibility as affected
by mental disorder has attracted the consistent
attention of the non-lawyer, and the literature
reflecting this interest is not remarkable for its
cogency or its wisdom. In general, the behavioral
sciences have left other issues relevant to crime
definition largely in default. There are a few exceptions. Dr. Hermann Mannheim, of the London
School of Economics, has manifested intelligent
interest in these matters." The late Professor
Edwin Sutherland's studies of "white-collar
crime"u0 may also be mentioned, although, in my
judgment, Professor Sutherland's efforts in this
field are among the least perceptive and satisfactory of his many valuable contributions."
The absence of wide-spread interest in these
areas is not to be explained by any lack of
challenging questions. Thus, what may be said of
the relationships between legislative efforts to
subject certain sorts of human behavior to penal
regulation and the persistence of police corruption
and abuse of power? 12 Studies of public attitudes
toward other sorts of criminal legislation might
provide valuable clues as to whether given regulatory objectives are more likely to be attained by
the provision of criminal penalties or by other
kinds of legal sanctions. It ought to be re-emphasized that the question, what sorts of behavior
should be declared criminal, is one to which the
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from many serious issues, but leads to a denial that
these issues even exist.
DEBASEMENT OF THE RrmABILITATivE

IDEAL

Now permit me to turn to another sort of
difficulty that has accompanied the rise of the
rehabilitative ideal in the areas of corrections and
criminal justice. It is a familiar observation that
an idea once propagated and introduced into the
active affairs of life undergoes change. The real
significance of an idea as it evolves in actual
practice may be quite different from that intended
by those who conceived it and gave it initial
support. An idea tends to lead a life of its own;
and modern history is full of the unintended
consequences of seminal ideas. The application of
the rehabilitative ideal to the institutions of criminal justice presents a striking example of such a
developm ent. My second proposition, then, is that
the rehabilitative ideal has been debased in
practice and that the consequences resulting from
this debasement are serious and, at times, dangerous.
This proposition may be supported, first, by the
observation that, under the dominance of the
rehabilitative ideal, the language of therapy is
frequently employed, wittingly or unwittingly, to
disguise the true state of affairs that prevails in
our custodial institutions and at other points in
the correctional process. Certain measures, like the
sexual psychopath laws, have been advanced and
supported as therapeutic in nature when, in fact,
16
such a characterization seems highly dubious.
Too often the vocabulary of therapy has been
exploited to serve a public-relations function.
Recently, I visited an institution devoted to the
diagnosis and treatment of disturbed children. The
institution had been established with high hopes
and, for once, with the enthusiastic support of the
state legislature. Nevertheless, fifty minutes of an
hour's lecture, delivered by a supervising psychiatrist before we toured the building, were
devoted to custodial problems. This fixation on
problems of custody was reflected in the institutional arrangements which included, under a
properly euphemistic label, a cell for solitary
confinement. 7 Even more disturbing was the
16 See note 25, infra.
17
As I recall, it was referred to as the "quiet room".
In another institution the boy was required to stand
before a wall while a seventy pound fire hose was
played on his back. This procedure went under the
name of "hydrotherapy."

tendency of the staff to justify these custodial
measures in therapeutic terms. Perhaps on occasion
the requirements of institutional security and
treatment coincide. But the inducements to selfdeception in such situations are strong and all too
apparent. In short, the language of therapy has
frequently provided a formidable obstacle to a
realistic analysis of the conditions that confront
us. And realism in considering these problems is
the one quality that we require above all others. 8
There is a second sort of unintended consequence
that has resulted from the application of the
rehabilitative ideal to the practical administration
of criminal justice. Surprisingly enough, the
rehabilitative ideal has often led to increased
severity of penal measures. This tendency may be
seen in the operation of the juvenile court. Although frequently condemned by the popular press
as a device of leniency, the juvenile court, is
authorized to intervene punitively in many situations in which the conduct, were it committed by
an adult, would be wholly ignored by the law or
would subject the adult to the mildest of sanctions.
The tendency of proposals for. wholly indeterminate sentences, a clearly identifiable fruit of the
rehabilitative ideal, 19 is unmistakably in the direction of lengthened periods of imprisonment. A
large variety of statutes authorizing what is called
"civil" commitment of persons, but which, except
for the reduced protections afforded the parties
proceeded against, are essentially crminal in
nature, provide for absolutely indeterminate periods of confinement. Experience has demonstrated
that, in practice, there is a strong tendency for the
rehabilitative ideal to serve purposes that are
essentially incapacitative rather than therapeutic
in character.y0
THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL AND
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

The reference to the tendency of the rehabilitative ideal to encourage increasingly long periods
of incarceration brings me to my final proposition.
18Cf. WEcHsL.R, Law, Morals and Psychiatry, 18
CoLum. L. ScaooL NEws 2, 4 (March 4, 1959): "The

danger rather is that coercive regimes we would not
sanction in the name of punishment or of correction
will be sanctified in the name of therapy without providing the resources for a therapeutic operation."
9 Cf. TAPPAN, Sentencing under the Model Penal
Code, 23 LAw AND CoNT. PROB. 538, 530 (1958).
20Cf. HALL,

JEROmE,

GENERAL PRINCIPLEs

oF

CRuNAr. LAW (1947) 551. And see SELL i: Tim
PROTEcTrVE CODE: A SwEDisH PROPOsAL (1957) 9.
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It is that the rise of the rehabilitative ideal has
often been accompanied by attitudes and measures
that conflict, sometimes seriously, with the values
of individual liberty and volition. As I have already
observed, the role of the behavioral sciences in the
administration of criminal justice and in the areas
of public policy lying on the borderland of the
criminal law is one of obvious importance. But I
suggest that, if the function of criminal justice is
considered in its proper dimensions, it will be
discovered that the most fundamental problems in
these areas are not those of psychiatry, sociology,
social case work, or social psychology. On the
contrary, the most fundamental problems are those
of political philosophy and political science. The
administration of the criminal law presents to any
community the most extreme issues of the proper
relations of the individual citizen to state power.
We are concerned here with the perennial issue of
political authority: Under what circumstances is
the state justified in bringing its force to bear on
the individual human being? These issues, of
course, are not confined to the criminal law, but it
is in the area of penal regulation that they are
most dramatically manifested. The criminal law,
then, is located somewhere near the center of the
political problem, as the history of the twentieth
century abundantly reveals. It is no accident, after
all, that the agencies of criminal justice and law
enforcement are those first seized by an emerging
totalitarian regime.2 ' In short, a study of criminal
justice is most fundamentally a study in the exercise of political power. No such study can properly
avoid the problem of the abuse of power.
The obligation of containing power within the
limits suggested by a community's political values
has been considerably complicated by the rise of
the rehabilitative ideal. For the problem today is
one of regulating the exercise of power by men of
good will, whose motivations are to help not to
injure, and whose ambitions are quite different
from those of the political adventurer so familiar
to history. There is a tendency for such persons to
claim immunity from the usual forms of restraint
and to insist that professionalism and a devotion to
science provide sufficient protections against unwarranted invasion of individual right. This attitude is subjected to mordant criticism by Aldous
Huxley in his recent book, "Brave New World
Revisited." Mr. Huxley observes: "There seems
21

This development in the case of Germany may be

gleaned from CRANKSIFAW, GESTAPO (1956).
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to be a touching belief among certain Ph.D's in
sociology that Ph.D's in sociology will never be
corrupted by power. Like Sir Galahad's, their
strength is the strength of ten because their heart
is pure-and their heart is pure because they are
scientists and have taken six thousand hours of
social studies." I suspect that Mr. Huxley would
be willing to extend his point to include professional
groups other than the sociologists. There is one
proposition which, if generally understood, would
contribute more to clear thinking on these matters
than any other. It is not a new insight. Seventy
years ago the Italian criminologist, Garafalo,
asserted: "The mere deprivation of liberty, however benign the administration of the place of
confinement, is undeniably punishment.2 '2 This
proposition may be rephrased as follows: Measures
which subject individuals to the substantial and
involuntary deprivation of their liberty are essentially punitive in character, and this reality is
not altered by the facts that the motivations that
prompt incarceration are to provide therapy or
otherwise contribute to the person's well-being or
reform. As such, these measures must be closely
scrutinized to insure that power is being applied
consistently with those values of the community
that justify interferences with liberty for only the
most clear and compelling reasons.
But the point I am making requires more specific
and concrete application to be entirely meaningful.
It should be pointed out, first, that the values of
individual liberty may be imperiled by claims to
knowledge and therapeutic technique that we, in
fact, do not possess and by failure candidly to
concede what we do not know. At times, practitioners of the behavioral sciences have been
guilty of these faults. At other times, such errors
have supplied the assumptions on which legislators,
lawyers and lay people generally have proceeded.
Ignorance, in itself, is not disgraceful so long as it
is unavoidable. But when we rush to measures
affecting human liberty and human dignity on the
assumption that we know what we do not know
or can do what we cannot do, then the problem of
ignorance takes on a more sinister hue. 4 An illustration of these dangers is provided by the sexual
psychopath laws, to which I return; for they
epitomize admirably some of the worst tendencies
22

HUxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED

34-35.
21Op. cit. supra, note 14, at 256.

(1958)

24 have developed these points in AU.Ex, op. cit.

supra, note 12, at 113-115.
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of modern practice. These statutes authorize the
indefinite incarceration of persons believed to be
potentially dangerous in their sexual behavior.
But can such persons be accurately identified
without substantial danger of placing persons
under restraint who, in fact, provide no serious
danger to the community? Having once confined
them, is there any body of knowledge that tells us
how to treat and cure them? If so, as a practical
matter, are facilities and therapy available for
these purposes in the state institutions provided
for the confinement of such persons? 25 Questions
almost as serious can be raised as to a whole range
of other measures. The laws providing for commitment of persons displaying the classic symptoms
of psychosis and advanced mental disorder have
proved a seductive analogy for other proposals.
But does our knowledge of human behavior really
justify the extension of these measures to provide
for the ihdefinite commitment of persons otherwise
afflicted? We who represent the disciplines that in
some measure are concerned with the control of
human behavior are required to act under weighty
responsibilities. It is no paradox to assert that the
real utility of scientific technique in the fields under
discussion depends on an accurate realization of
the limits of scientific knowledge.
There are other ways in which the modern
tendencies of thought accompanying the rise of
the rehabilitative ideal have imperiled the basic
political values. The most important of these is
the encouragement of procedural laxness and
irregularity. It is my impression that there is
greater awareness of these dangers today than at
some other times in the past, for which, if true, we
perhaps have Mr. Hitler to thank. Our increased
knowledge of the functioning of totalitarian regimes makes it more difficult to assert that the
insistence on decent and orderly procedure represents simply a lawyer's quibble or devotion to
outworn ritual. Nevertheless, in our courts of socalled "socialized justice" one may still observe,
on occasion, a tendency to assume that, since the
purpose of the proceeding is to "help" rather than
to "punish", some lack of concern in establishing
25

Many competent observers have asserted that
none of these inquiries can properly be answered in the
affirmative. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRinr. L., C. An P.S. 543 (1950)
HACKER AND FRnir, The Sexual Psychopath Act in
Practice:A Critical Discussion, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 766
(1955). See also TAPPAN, THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER (Report of the -New Jersey Commission)
(1950).

the charges against the person before the court
may be justified. This position is self-defeating
and otherwise indefensible. A child brought before
the court has a right to demand, not only the
benevolent concern of the tribunal, but justice.
And one may rightly wonder as to the value of
therapy purchased at the expense of justice. The
essential point is that the issues of treatment and
therapy be kept clearly distinct from the question
of whether the person committed the acts which
authorize the intervention of state power in the
first instance. 26 This is a principle often violated.
Thus, in some courts the judge is supplied a report
on the offender by the psychiatric clinic before the
judgment of guilt or acquittal is announced. Such
reports, while they may be relevant to the defendant's need for therapy or confinement, ordinarily are wholly irrelevant to the issue of his guilt
of the particular offense charged. Yet it asks too
much of human nature to assume that the judge
is never influenced on the issue of guilt or innocence by a strongly adverse psychiatric report.
Let me give one final illustration of the problems
that have accompanied the rise of the rehabilitative ideal. Some time ago we encountered a man
in his eighties incarcerated in a state institution.
He had been confined for some thirty years under
a statute calling for the automatic commitment of
defendants acquitted on grounds of insanity in
criminal trials. It was generally agreed by the
institution's personnel that he was not then psychotic and probably had never been psychotic. The
fact seemed to be that he had killed his wife while
drunk. An elderly sister of the old man was able
and willing to provide him with a home, and he
was understandably eager to leave the institution.
When we asked the director of the institution why
the old man was not released, he gave two significant answers. In the first place, he said, the statute
requires me to find that this inmate is no longer a
danger to the community; this I cannot do, for he
may kill again. And of course the director was
right. However unlikely commission of homicide
by such a man in his eighties might appear, the
-26 A considerable literature has developed on these
issues. See, e.g., AuL-EN, The Borderland of the Criminal
Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice, 32
Soc. SER. REv. 107 (1958), DIANA, The Rights of
Juvenile Delinquents: An Appraisal of Juvenile Court
Proceedings, 44 J. CRI-,. L., C. AN P.S. 561 (1957),
PAULSEN, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 M1NNI-.
L. REv. 547 (1957); WAITE, How Far Can Court Procedures Be Socialized without Impairing Individual
Rights? 12 J. CRnr. L. AND C. 430 (1921).
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director could not be certain. But, as far as that
goes, he also could not be certain about himself or
about you or me. The second answer was equally
interesting. The old man, he said, is better off here.
To understand the full significance of this reply it is
necessary to know something about the place of
confinement. Although called a hospital, it was in
fact a prison, and not at all a progressive prison.
Nothing worthy of the name of therapy was
provided and very little by way of recreational
facilities.
This case points several morals. It illustrates,
first, a failure of the law to deal adequately with
the new requirements being placed upon it. The
statute, as a condition to the release of the inmate,
required the director of the institution virtually to
warrant the future good behavior of the inmate,
and, in so doing, made unrealistic and impossible
demands on expert judgment. This might be
remedied by the formulation of release criteria
more consonant with actuality. Provisions for
conditional release to test the inmate's reaction
to the free community would considerably reduce
the strain on administrative decision-making. But
there is more here. Perhaps the case reflects
that arrogance and insensitivity to human values
to which men who have no reason to doubt their
own motives appear peculiarly susceptible.2
-,
One further recent and remarkable example is
provided by the case, In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358,
88 N.W. 2d 470 (1958). PROFESSOR WEcHsLRx, op.
cit. supra, note 18, at 4, describes the facts and holding
as follows: "Only the other day, the Supreme Court of
Michigan ordered the release of a prisoner in their
State prison at Jackson, who had been transferred from
the Ionia State Hospital to which he was committed as
a psychopath. The ground of transfer, which was defended seriously by a State psychiatrist, was that the
prisoner was 'adamant' in refusing to admit sexual
deviation that was the basis of his commitment; and

[Vol. so

CONCLUSION
In these remarks I have attempted to describe
certain of the continuing problems and difficulties
associated with, what I have called, the rise of the
rehabilitative ideal. In so doing, I have not sought
to cast doubt on the substantial benefits associated
with that movement. It has exposed some of the
most intractable problems of our time to the
solvent properties of human intelligence. Moreover, the devotion to the ideal of empirical investigation provides the movement with a selfcorrecting mechanism of great importance, and
justifies hopes for constructive future development.
Nevertheless, no intellectual movement produces
only unmixed blessings. It has been suggested in
these remarks that the ascendency of the rehabilitative ideal has, as one of its unfortunate
consequences, diverted attention from other questions of great criminological importance. This has
operated unfavorably to the full development of
criminological science. Not only is this true, but
the failure of many students and practitioners in
the relevant areas to concern themselves with the
full context of criminal justice has produced
measures dangerous to basic political values and
has, on occasion, encouraged the debasement of
the rehabilitative ideal to produce results, unsupportable whether measured by the objectives of
therapy or of corrections. The worst manifestations
of these tendencies are undoubtedly deplored as
sincerely by competent therapists as by other
persons. But the occurrences are neither so infrequent nor so trivial that they can be safely
ignored.
thus, in the psychiatrist's view, resistant to therapy!
The Court's answer was, of course, that he had not
been tried for an offense."

